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GRADES ARE NO LONGER JUST FOR STUDENTS: FORCED 
RANKING, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE QUEST TO ATTAIN 
A MORE COMPETENT WORKFORCE 
Meredith L. Myers* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration of Independence states that “all men are 
created equal.”1  While persons may be inherently equal, no 
individual performs equally in recital of his employment duties.  
Performance variations lead most employers to adopt systems of 
performance management2 that essentially “award” the achievers and 
“penalize” the inefficient.  Some companies implement formal 
performance management systems, while others appraise employees 
informally using loose and indistinct criteria.3  Thus, there are 
literally scores of “systems” in effect throughout the United States. 
There is a growing trend among companies—mostly large 
corporations—to engage in a method of management where 
employers conduct employee performance appraisals and then use 
the evaluations to rank the employees against each other from “[b]est 
to worst.”4  This performance management system is commonly 
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 1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 2 See, e.g., DICK GROTE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL ix 
(1996). 
 3 See id. at pp. 36-80 (profiling various models of performance evaluation). 
 4 John Greenwald, Rank and Fire: Attrition Isn’t Working, So Best-to-Worst Grading is 
Gaining—and Those on the Bottom Get the Boot, TIME, June 18, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 22574432.  Approximately twenty percent of companies use a formal ranking 
system. Forced Rankings: Tough Love or Overkill?, HRFOCUS (Inst. of Mgmt. & Admin., 
New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2002, available at 2002 WL 5659587 [hereinafter Overkill].  
Many other companies informally utilize grading in their performance management 
systems.  Id.  Some contend that the increase in use of forced ranking is the result of 
a slowing economy, which has tightened the job market and caused employers to 
place more emphasis on merit based pay.  Matthew Boyle, Performance Reviews: Perilous 
Curves Ahead, FORTUNE, May 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2172786.  See also Carol 
Hazard, Forced Rankings in Legal Tangle: Employee Lawsuits Brewing at Capital One, 
RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, June 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7201556 [hereinafter 
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referred to as “forced ranking.”5  Many prominent companies 
advocate forced ranking as an effective way to eliminate ineffective 
employees and to reward superior performance, but the technique is 
receiving substantial attention and severe criticism.6  Whatever the 
reason for the burgeoning use of forced ranking as the preferred 
system of performance management, there is no question it is a 
growing trend that is highly criticized and is generating lawsuits.7  
Forced ranking is a mounting plaintiff’s target, and plaintiffs accuse it 
of creating a law school type mentality, where employees sabotage 
each other because the grading is on a curve.8  Lawsuits filed around 
the country allege that forced ranking systems are easily abused and 
that the models create discrimination on the basis of age, gender, 
race, and citizenship.9 
 
Hazard, Lawsuits Brew].  When the economy is stagnant, the job market narrows.  Id.  
As a result, there is less change in employment through attrition.  Greenwald, supra 
note 4.  Forced ranking can be a useful tool in eliminating employees staying with a 
company for job security, versus employees who are looking to contribute 
meaningfully.  Id. 
 5 Forced ranking is also identified by other names, but this Comment addresses 
the model solely as forced ranking.  Employees are evaluated using various criteria, 
and employers then use those evaluations to rank the employees from “best to worst” 
or on some type of bell curve; an employee’s “rank” is often used to determine if his 
job performance merits a wage/salary increase or whether it is stellar enough to 
justify a promotion, or poor enough to warrant a lay-off or termination.  See Reed 
Abelson, Companies Turn to Grades, and Employees Go to Court, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 
19, 2001, available at LEXIS, News; Brent M. Longnecker, Rank & Yank: The Problems 
with Forced Ranking, at http://www.workforce.com/archive/feature/22/29/72/index 
.php (Aug. 3, 2001) (last visited Apr. 5, 2003) (on file with author). 
 6 See, e.g., Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News. 
 7 See, e.g., Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556.  
Critics allege that forced ranking systems grade employees by using nonobjective 
criteria, and then make use of those grades to determine pay and possible 
termination.  Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News.  The grading system 
forces employers to identify some employees as low performers.  Id.  Multiple lawsuits 
have called the practice discriminatory, claiming that forced ranking performance 
management systems have a disparate impact on certain protected classes.  Id.; see 
also discussion of disparate impact at Parts IV.A. and IV.B.1 of this Comment; 
examples of litigation involving forced ranking models at Part II.B.  Conversely, the 
proponents of the system argue forced ranking raises the bar of performance and 
increases the quality of a workforce.  Id.; see also Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 
WL 5659587. 
 8 Del Jones, More Firms Cut Workers Ranked at Bottom to Make Way for Talent, USA 
TODAY, May 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5463668.  Many critics believe forced 
ranking discourages teamwork.  Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 
22574432.  The mentality, some argue, is that employees are afraid that if they help 
each other, the person they assisted may get a better “grade” than they do.  Id. 
 9 Jones, supra note 8, available at 2001 WL 5463668; see also discussion and 
accompanying notes infra Part II.B. for examples of litigation stemming from the use 
of forced ranking systems. 
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Companies differ as to the precise criteria or ranking models 
they utilize,10 but generally, forced ranking involves employers 
evaluating employees according to certain criteria and then ranking 
the employees against each other based on their evaluations.11  
Ultimately, the employees are given some type of “grade.”12  
Numerous variations of the forced ranking management system 
exist.13  Generally, forced ranking involves the use of three categories 
that include some manifestation of superior, average, and below 
average/needs improvement.14 
Part I of this Comment explores the underlying purposes of why 
companies conduct performance appraisals, the functions the 
appraisals serve, and why many companies are moving toward forced 
ranking as the preferred method of performance management.  Part 
II details various forced ranking models that corporations employ, 
and concludes by assessing recent litigation addressing the use of 
forced ranking management systems and the challenges those models 
present.  Part III scrutinizes the mixed views over the effectiveness 
and ability of forced ranking to fairly evaluate employees without 
creating a disparate impact on protected classes, noting both the 
disdain and favor the system generates.  Finally, Part IV reviews the 
colorful development of the disparate impact theory, including what 
is required for a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of disparate 
impact, and what defenses are available to an employer whose forced 
ranking model is challenged under the disparate impact theory.  This 
analysis concludes that forced ranking does not, as some 
commentators suggest, inherently create a disparate impact on 
protected classes.  Rather, disparate impact analysis must instead be 
applied to forced ranking systems on a case-by-case basis, because 
each model employs different criteria.  Furthermore, Part IV 
postulates risk-management measures employers may undertake to 
avoid or reduce the risk of costly litigation brought by employees 
claiming that a company’s forced ranking performance management 
system creates a disparate impact on protected classes. 
 
 10 See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part II.A. 
 11 See, e.g., Geoffrey Colvin, We Can’t All be Above Average, FORTUNE, Aug. 13, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 2173120 [hereinafter Colvin, Above Average]. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587. 
 14 See discussion of models infra Part II.A. 
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I.  THE NEED FOR AN EVALUATIVE SYSTEM 
A.  General Purpose of Performance Evaluation Systems 
Undoubtedly, some type of performance management system is 
necessary to evaluate an employee’s job performance.15  If employees 
are not consistently and uniformly evaluated, a multitude of 
problems could result.16  Some of those problems include employee 
confusion regarding how they are expected to perform and what they 
are expected to do; those not performing may be overlooked and 
their behavior left uncorrected, while those employees exemplifying 
outstanding performance may not be justly rewarded causing their 
productivity to decrease.17  Furthermore, if a personnel decision is 
challenged, a company may not be equipped with an adequate 
defense of its decision.18  Employers must be able to terminate 
employees who are not performing, and appraisal systems can be an 
effective tool in rewarding and increasing efficiency and productivity, 
while removing those individuals not satisfying company standards.19 
The use of performance evaluation systems has dramatically 
increased since World War II.20  In fact, performance evaluations 
remain the leading source of data for decisions determining raises 
and promotions.21  Evaluating employees is justifiable, because 
measurement of past behavior is a good indicator of how employees 
are likely to perform in the future.22  Typically, employees who were 
 
 15 Decreased productivity by the American worker is largely the result of a 
breakdown in the administration of performance appraisals.  JOE BAKER, JR., CAUSES 
OF FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL AND SUPERVISION 7 (1988). 
 16 Id. at 9. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 7.  Many companies view forced ranking as a tool that enables them to 
better focus on the employees producing the best results.  Overkill, supra note 4, 
available at 2002 WL 5659587; see also RONALD B. MORGAN & JACK E. SMITH, STAFFING 
THE NEW WORKPLACE: SELECTING AND PROMOTING FOR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 252 
(1996); John Edward Davidson, The Temptation of Performance Appraisal Abuse in 
Employment Litigation, 81 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1995) (noting the widespread use of 
performance appraisals as a method to increase both efficiency and productivity 
among employees); id. at 1608 (indicating performance evaluation systems are an 
effective method to attaining a more competent workforce, to identify company 
needs, and to convey company objectives—the ultimate result being a more 
profitable and efficient company). 
 20 Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207, 1228 (1988). 
 21 MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19; see also Davidson, supra note 19, at 1609 
(noting the extensive utilization of performance appraisal systems in the United 
States). 
 22 MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 323; See also Davidson, supra note 19, at 
1609. 
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exemplary workers in the past will remain so, while those who were 
not consistently valuable are not likely to change notably.23 
Equally important, however, is the necessity for guidance and 
structure so that each employee knows what is expected of him.24  
When employees are provided with the requisite information 
regarding what type of performance is essential to succeed within 
their company, it becomes easier for employers to make distinctions 
between the employees in their labor pool.25  Performance 
evaluations are an invaluable tool in large corporations where poor 
job performance may perpetuate unnoticed.26  Performance 
management systems that judge employees performing the same 
tasks against clear, objective, and relevant criteria, result in 
evaluations that serve as an effective tool in identifying both 
exceptional and unsatisfactory employee performance.27  Ultimately, 
refusing to acknowledge or failing to notice deficient employee 
performance generates tension among a company’s best employees.28  
Eventually, the employer will experience the aftermath of ignored or 
unnoticed low productivity and performance in its pocket.29  
Employment decisions that are inadequately documented may also 
lead to costly litigation.30  Presently, the majority of lawsuits alleging 
 
 23 MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 323. 
 24 JACK WELCH WITH JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 156 (2001) 
[hereinafter WELCH]. 
 25 Id. at 157. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 322-27. 
 28 Colvin, Above Average, supra note 11, available at 2001 WL 2173120.  A survey of 
thousands of employees revealed fifty-nine percent of those surveyed wanted their 
companies to eliminate the underperformers.  Geoffrey Colvin, Make Sure You Chop 
the Dead Wood: Mass Layoffs Won’t Work if You Can’t Get Rid of Weak Managers, FORTUNE, 
Jan. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2172249 [hereinafter Colvin, Dead Wood].  Only 
seven percent of those surveyed believed their companies were eliminating 
underperformers.  Id. 
 29 A recent survey revealed that a company maintaining employees who perform 
poorly creates a vicious cycle that blocks development for promising employees, 
causes productivity and morale to plummet, induces promising employees to leave 
the company, and ultimately results in fewer star employees being attracted to the 
company.  Colvin, Dead Wood, supra note 28, available at 2001 WL 2172249.  
Employees surveyed who had worked for companies that failed to weed out the low 
and/or underperformers, commented that the experience “prevented me from 
learning, hurt my career development, prevented me from making a larger 
contribution to the bottom line, made me want to leave the company.”  Id.  (internal 
quotes omitted). 
 30 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON INSTITUTE, PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS: THE LATEST 
LEGAL NIGHTMARE 8 (1986) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS] (noting the value 
of documented performance appraisals at any level of work, and citing a case where 
an employer terminated an employee at his gas station after making general 
 686 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:681 
discrimination challenge an employee’s discharge.31 
B.  Rationale Behind Forced Ranking as the Preferred Performance 
Management System 
Approximately one-quarter of all Fortune 500 companies utilize 
a forced ranking performance management system.32  Corporations 
use forced ranking to make clearer distinctions between their best 
and worst employees by ensuring that management is honestly 
evaluating them.33  Forced ranking compels management to identify a 
percentage of a company’s employees as unsatisfactory performers.34 
Conducting employee performance appraisals is undoubtedly a 
difficult and unpleasant task.35  Anxiety typically abounds for both the 
employee and management at the mere mention of the need to 
conduct a performance appraisal.36  Nonetheless, performance 
evaluations are one of the most essential responsibilities that 
management must undertake.37  As mentioned previously, there are 
many reasons why employers should utilize performance evaluations.  
A well-reasoned, consistent system can produce meaningful results 
that are positive to a company, because the evaluations affect future 
company performance.38  A management system that is properly 
implemented and documents the justifications for an employee’s 
evaluation could shield a company from litigation resulting from 
alleged wrongful dismissal of an employee.39  Managers not utilizing a 
company’s performance management system could be generating a 
plaintiff’s litigation tool.  If an employee brings an action for 
 
criticisms of the attendant’s work, but never documented the employee’s 
performance in a formal evaluation; the employee gas station attendant won his 
case); see also Dare v. Mont. Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984). 
 31 John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991). 
 32 Some of the Fortune 500 companies utilizing a forced ranking performance 
evaluation system include General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, Sun Microsystems, 
Intel, and Cisco.  Christine A. Amalfe & Heather A. Adelman, Forced Ranking: Latest 
Plaintiffs’ Target, 10 N.J.L. 1554, Aug. 13, 2001, at 10; see also discussion of corporate 
models infra Part II.A. 
 33 Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Max Messmer, Measuring Staff Performance, (The Metropolitan Corporate 
Counsel, Inc.), Aug. 2000, at 38 (Northeast ed.). 
 36 Id.  Employees fear being “graded,” while evaluations cause apprehension for 
management who fear the potential repercussions presented by employees receiving 
negative evaluations.  Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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wrongful dismissal or discrimination and no documentation exists to 
justify his dismissal, a court may assume the employee’s performance 
was satisfactory.40 
Because management is often uncomfortable evaluating 
employees’ weaknesses and informing them of those deficiencies, 
standard performance evaluations tend to produce “false kindness.”41  
The end result is that if an employee is eventually laid off or fired, he 
may be shocked because he received appraisals indicating his 
performance was satisfactory.42  Jack Welch, former Chief Executive 
Officer (“CEO”) of General Electric (“GE”), recalls a situation in his 
book, where he asked a manager at GE why he gave a particular 
employee a stellar appraisal when he knew the employee did not 
deserve it.43  The manager’s response was that he was trying to be “a 
nice guy” by protecting an employee who was not performing 
adequately.44  Unlike “traditional” performance appraisals, forced 
ranking systems have the potential to make management’s job easier, 
because forced ranking requires management to eliminate employees 
who are not satisfying company standards, and at the same time the 
system demands continuous improvement.45 
II.  FORCED RANKING SYSTEMS IN PRACTICE 
A.  Corporate Models 
Commentators suggest that GE is the innovator of the modern 
forced ranking system.46  GE is a major corporation employing more 
 
 40 Messmer, supra note 35, at 38; see also Davidson, supra note 19, at 1618 
(commenting that the performance evaluation “has been as effective a shield as it has 
been a sword,” because poor evaluations that are well documented serve as 
protection for employers against wrongful dismissal claims by providing 
nondiscriminatory and legitimate reasons for an employee’s termination); 
PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS, supra note 30, at 17 (noting the value of candid appraisals, 
and stating that inflated evaluations may destroy an employer’s opportunity to 
overcome an employee’s wrongful discharge claim). 
 41 See, e.g., WELCH, supra note 24, at 58. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id.  Jack Welch indicates that these false appraisals came back to haunt him 
when GE was forced to downsize in the 1980s.  Id.; see also Davidson, supra note 19, at 
1610 (noting that supervisors commonly refrain from honestly evaluating a marginal 
employee because they “wish to avoid ‘playing God’ by ruining an employee’s 
record”). 
 45 Julie Crane, Forced Ranking—The Right Way, (Fair Measures, 
www.FairMeasures.com), May 15, 2001, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/ 
whatsnew/articles/new237.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003) (on file with author). 
 46 See, e.g., Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556. 
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than 300,000 employees and 4,000 senior managers.47  “[M]ore than 
just touchy-feely good intentions” are needed to produce a true and 
effective performance appraisal in such a large corporation.48  When 
Jack Welch took over management of GE, he was shocked and 
dismayed to find that the company was rife with underperformers.49  
Mr. Welch realized that the pool of underperformers in GE’s 
workforce was largely a consequence of management’s unwillingness 
to bear the often unpleasant task of conferring on an employee a 
poor evaluation—even when a poor evaluation may be well 
deserved.50  The forced ranking system Mr. Welch implemented is 
referred to at GE as the “vitality curve.”51 
GE’s vitality curve requires that managers rank their employees 
(management included) by the top twenty percent (“Top 20”), the 
middle seventy percent (“The Vital 70”), and the bottom ten percent 
(“The Bottom 10”).52  Ultimately, the distinctions are arrived at by 
sorting out the “A,” “B,” and “C” players.53  Requiring managers to 
“[rank] employees on a 20-70-10 grid forces managers to make tough 
decisions and allows the top performers to be justifiably rewarded so 
they stay happy and willing to grow with the company.”54  The forced 
ranking promotes efficiency within the company,55 and GE maintains 
that not removing the bottom ten percent early in their careers 
 
 47 WELCH, supra note 24, at 156. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 58. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 158. 
 52 Id.  According to Mr. Welch, ranking employees continually raises the bar and 
caliber of the GE workforce.  WELCH, supra note 24, at 158.  The result, is that the 
employees at the top must continue to exhibit the qualities and performance 
required to stay there, while those on the bottom are generally forced to leave.  Id. 
 53 Id.  The employees in the “A” category are passionate, committed to bringing 
about results, open minded, and have room to grow.  Id.  The “As” “make business 
productive and fun at the same time.”  Id.  Mr. Welch refers to these “A” category 
qualities as the “four Es” of GE leadership: high energy, ability to energize others, an 
edge to make tough decisions, and an ability to execute and deliver on pledges.  Id.  
“The Bs are the heart of the company and critical to its operational success.”  WELCH, 
supra note 24, at 159.  The Bs, however, do not possess the same passion that the “As” 
do.  Id.  The “C” employee fails to get the job done.  Id. at 160.  “C” players enervate 
others and procrastinate.  Id.  “Cs” are not valuable enough as employees to justify 
expending time on them.  Id. 
 54 Id.  Rewarding the top performers with stock options, raises, and promotions 
helps GE maintain its best employees.  WELCH, supra note 24, at 160.  GE loses less 
than one percent of its “As” per year.  Id. 
 55 Jack Welch is quoted as saying, “A company that bets its future on its people 
must remove that lower 10 percent, and keep removing it every year—always raising 
the bar of performance and increasing the quality of its leadership.”  Abelson, supra 
note 5, available at LEXIS, News. 
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would be to do them a disservice.56  The company regularly reassesses 
its system based on employee feedback.57 
Other companies also use forced ranking systems.  At least prior 
to its current reorganization efforts, Enron force ranked its 
employees biannually on a five-point scale.58  Employees were 
differentiated into tiers by “superior” (top five percent), in the 
middle were the “excellent” (thirty percent), “strong” (thirty percent) 
and “satisfactory” (twenty percent), while the “needs improvement” 
were on the bottom (bottom fifteen percent).59  Employees falling in 
the bottom fifteen percent were placed on probationary status and 
given a period of six months to meet the requisite standard or be 
terminated.60 
Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) conducts performance 
evaluations and force ranks its employees twice a year.61  Management 
assigns each employee a scaled rating from 1.0 to 5.0 and then ranks 
the employee among the other members in his division.62  Within 
each work group, twenty-five percent must be rated 3.0 or below, 
forty percent will be rated 3.5, and only thirty-five percent will receive 
a rating of 4.0 or higher.63  Salary adjustments, stock option awards, 
and promotional opportunities are offered according to the 
employee’s rank.64  Management provides employees who are 
unhappy with their rank the opportunity to appeal.65 
Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) original forced ranking system 
created enormous controversy.66  In fact, Ford’s system was so 
 
 56 “There’s no cruelty like waiting and telling people late in their careers that 
they don’t belong—just when their job options are limited and they’re putting their 
children through college or paying off big mortgages.”  WELCH, supra note 24, at 162. 
 57 Pamela Williams, The Secret Sacking Tool, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, May 4, 
2002, at 21.  A recent decision by GE to award employees with stock options was 
based on employee feedback indicating that they felt demoralized by GE’s use of 
forced ranking.  Id. 
 58 Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 22574432. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and Defendant’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment at 3-4, Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., No. C00-1684P 
(W.D. Wash. 2001) [hereinafter Pechman Order]. 
 62 Id. at 4. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News. 
 66 Ford’s original system mandated strict quotas that required certain employees 
be placed in the category of poor performance.  Mark Truby, Ford Ends Grading 
Quotas: Automaker to Stop Mandating the Number of Bad Reviews, DETROIT NEWS, July 10, 
2001, at 1 [hereinafter Truby, Grading Quotas].  It sparked widespread dissent among 
both employees and management, and led to a multitude of discrimination suits.  Id. 
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controversial that the company overhauled its original system and 
instituted a new version.67  The original system gave employees grades 
of “A,” “B,” or “C,” forcing ten percent to be graded “A,” eighty 
percent “B,” and ten percent “C.”68  Managers receiving a “C” were 
not eligible for bonuses or raises, and were thereafter put on notice 
that another consecutive “C” rating could result in the manager’s 
demotion69 or termination.70  Ford’s ultimate goal was to eliminate 
deficient employees who might otherwise “fall through the cracks” 
using traditional employee evaluations.71  Ford’s revised forced 
ranking system variegates employees by “top achievers,” “achievers,” 
and those “needing improvement.”72  The new system does not 
mandate a specific percentage of employees for each category,73 nor 
does it prevent low ranked managers from receiving a bonus or merit 
increase.74 
Sun Microsystems (“Sun”) also diverged from its original forced 
ranking system.75  Instead, Sun adopted a more “employee friendly” 
approach that provides employees with supplemental resources to 
treat the root cause of poor performance, rather than automatically 
terminating employees falling in the bottom category.76  Sun’s “new 
and improved” forced ranking model reduces its number of tiers 
from five to three.77  The revised model characterizes employees by 
the top twenty percent (“superior”), the middle seventy percent 
(“Sun Standard”), and the bottom ten percent 
(“underperformers”).78  Interestingly, this is the same breakdown as 
 
 67 Mark Truby, Jac the Knife Falls Under Ford Axe, EDMONTON SUN, Nov. 2, 2001, at 
DR4 [hereinafter Truby, Jac the Knife].  Ford’s original forced ranking system was 
revamped as a result of devastated morale.  Id.  Some argue that Ford’s original 
system, implemented by former CEO Jacques A. Nasser, led to his demise.  Id. 
 68 Truby, Grading Quotas, supra note 66, at 1. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Truby, Jac the Knife, supra note 67, at DR4. 
 71 Truby, Grading Quotas, supra note 66, at 1.  Ford studied GE’s forced ranking 
policy closely.  Id.  After observing the effectiveness of forced ranking at other 
companies, especially GE, Ford decided to implement its own system in an attempt to 
cease the shuffling around of underperformers within other divisions of the 
company.  Id. 
 72 Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Williams, supra note 57, at 21. 
 75 Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 22574432; see also Overkill, supra 
note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587. 
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GE’s “vitality curve” which commentators agree is largely successful.79  
At Sun, the bottom ten percent have the choice of leaving with an 
exit package or following a plan to improve their performance,80 a 
plan that includes one-on-one coaching to help them meet the 
requisite standard.81 
B.  Recent Litigation Stemming from Forced Ranking Performance 
Management Systems 
As mentioned previously, forced ranking is a controversial 
method of performance management and is generating a firestorm 
of litigation.  Some major corporations (including Capital One 
Financial Corporation,82 Ford Motor Company,83 Microsoft 
Corporation,84 Conoco, Inc.,85 and a GE subsidiary86) have had 
complaints and lawsuits filed against them alleging discrimination 
claims based on their use of forced ranking. 
 
 79 See supra Part II.A. 
 80 Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587.  The human resources 
department at Sun indicates the purpose of the new system is to divert employees’ 
attention away from the grade and toward improving their performance.  Id. 
 81 Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 22574432.  Sun CEO Scott 
McNealy stated that the bottom ten percent are the employees Sun “love[s] . . . to 
death.”  Id.  The “love” is offered by the opportunity to receive personal coaching to 
meet the Sun standard, but if that “love” in not reciprocated, those employees falling 
in the bottom ten percent will face their “death” in the form of a prompt exit.  Id. 
 82 Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556.  Capital 
One’s system mandates that eight to twelve percent of employees receive a grade of 
“3s” (below expectations) or “3 pluses” (approaches expectations), ten to fifteen 
percent receive “5 minuses” (excellent) or “5s” (outstanding), and the remaining 
employees fall in between the categories.  Carol Hazard, Virginia’s Capital One Said to 
be Firing High Performers with Big Salaries, May 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 21242669.  
Since Capital One instituted its system in 2001, approximately one dozen complaints 
alleging age discrimination have been filed against the company with the Equal 
Opportunity Commission.  Id.  An attorney representing former Capital One 
employees indicates that “[i]f the charges are not resolved at the administrative level, 
we fully intend to file [a] class action suit under the Age Discrimination and 
Employment Act.”  Id. 
 83 Ford settled two class action suits alleging race and gender discrimination in 
2002 for $10.5 million, as well as an individual claim for an undisclosed amount.  
Mark Truby, Ford Settles Bias Suit, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 27, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
14872212 [hereinafter Ford Settles].  See also notes 87-95 and accompanying text. 
 84 See notes 99-124 and accompanying text. 
 85 The U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against Conoco, Inc., alleging the 
company discriminated against United States citizens by favoring foreign workers.  
Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556.  The suit was 
settled in 2002 for an undisclosed amount.  Id. 
 86 The action against the GE subsidiary is pending and alleges age and race 
discrimination.  Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556.  
The lawsuit seeks class action status, which was not yet granted at the time this 
Comment was written.  Id. 
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Many employees filed lawsuits as a result of Ford’s first forced 
ranking system, claiming it was discriminatory against older workers 
and white males.87  Ford denies that it changed the initial system 
because it unfairly targeted white males or older employees.88  
Instead, Ford maintains that the initial forced ranking model was 
changed as a result of complaints from management that the original 
system produced a negative effect on morale.89  In response to Ford’s 
denial, AARP commented that companies often use forced ranking as 
a tactic to force out older employees.90  Two class action suits were 
filed in Michigan as a result Ford’s original forced ranking system 
adopted in January 2000.91  Streeter v. Ford92 was brought by older white 
males claiming Ford’s forced ranking system had “a disparate impact 
on Caucasians, males, and older workers.”93  Siegel v. Ford94 alleged 
Ford’s forced ranking system was used to give older workers poor 
evaluations to essentially weed them out, thereby creating a disparate 
impact on older employees.95  Ford reached a settlement with these 
plaintiffs in 2001, agreeing to pay them more than $10.5 million.96  In 
March 2002, Ford settled another high profile lawsuit filed by former 
human resources manager John Kovacs.97  Mr. Kovacs’ case alleged 
reverse discrimination, claiming Ford’s ranking program unfairly 
targeted older white males.98 
Former employees filed lawsuits against Microsoft alleging its 
forced ranking model creates a disparate impact on African 
Americans and women because it is inherently and excessively 
subjective in nature, resulting in evaluations that are subject to bias.99  
 
 87 Truby, Grading Quotas, supra note 66, at 1. 
 88 Ford Ends Quotas on Performance, United Press International, July 10, 2001, 
available at LEXIS, News [hereinafter Ford Ends Quotas]. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10. 
 92 Streeter v. Ford Motor Co., No. 01-105949-CL (Mich. Circ. Ct. Wayne Co. Feb. 
21, 2001). 
 93 Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10. 
 94 Siegel v. Ford Motor Co., No. 01-102583-CL (Mich. Circ. Ct. Wayne Co. Jan. 23, 
2001). 
 95 Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10.  See discussion infra note 185 (noting 
the current circuit split over whether disparate impact applies to ADEA claims). 
 96 Ford Settles,  supra note 83, available at 2002 WL 14872212. 
 97 Id.; see also Kovacs v. Ford Motor Co., File No. 01-121039-NO (Mich. Circ. Ct. 
Wayne Co. June 21, 2001). 
 98 See, e.g., Mark Truby, Ford Countersues in Reverse Bias Case, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 
5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5112213. 
 99 Setback for Bias Suit Against Microsoft, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, available at 
2001 WL 3527084.  The complaint in Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., filed in the Western 
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The lawsuits reflect dissatisfaction on the part of some minorities and 
women with respect to the alleged effects of Microsoft’s ranking 
system.100  Microsoft employee Peter M. Browne, one of the 
corporation’s highest ranking African American employees, filed a 
lawsuit against the company in October of 1999.101  Mr. Browne’s suit 
alleged race and age discrimination and cited Microsoft’s grading 
system as one of the corporation’s discriminatory practices that 
generates a disparate impact on African Americans and older 
employees.102  Mr. Browne claimed Microsoft’s forced ranking system 
required that he and other managers rate employees without the use 
of objective criteria.103  The result, according to Mr. Browne, is that 
the most highly rated employees are typically those who socialize with 
and are most like the managers.104  More often than not, this means 
that those employees receiving favorable ratings and promotions105 
are white males.106 
On May 8, 2001, the United States District Court for the District 
of Washington granted summary judgment for Microsoft on all five 
counts of Mr. Browne’s complaint.107  With respect to the disparate 
impact claim, the court stated that Mr. Browne did not show that 
Microsoft’s evaluation criteria creates a disparate impact on African 
American and older workers.108  The court stated that statistical 
evidence is the only way to prove that Microsoft’s ranking system 
induces a disparate impact.109  The plaintiff, the court posited, “failed 
to make the requisite showing,”110 and Mr. Browne instead offered 
 
District of Washington on October 4, 2000, alleged Microsoft’s rating system “permits 
managers, who are predominantly white males, to rate employees based upon their 
own biases rather than based upon merit.”  Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, 
News.  Microsoft maintains that its system is both fair and helpful, gives the highest 
compensation to those who deserve it, and contains its own system of checks and 
balances.  Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Browne v. Microsoft Corp., No. C99-1665C (W.D. Wash. 2000).  See also 
Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10. 
 105 Mr. Browne contended he was repeatedly passed over for promotions that were 
given to younger, non-black males who were less qualified than he.  Plaintiff’s Second 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Browne v. Microsoft Corp., No. 
C99-1665C (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 106 Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10. 
 107 See Order of the Hon. John C. Coughenour at 2, Browne v. Microsoft, No. C99-
1665C (W.D. Wash. 2001) [hereinafter Order of Coughenour]. 
 108 Id. at 5. 
 109 Id. at 4. 
 110 See discussion infra Part IV.A., setting forth a what a plaintiff is required to 
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“bottom line evidence of racial imbalance” which the Supreme 
Court111 expressly rejects as sufficient to prove disparate impact 
exists.112 
In another suit brought against Microsoft filed in October 2000, 
Monique Donaldson, an African American woman and former 
Microsoft employee, filed a complaint on behalf of herself and all 
similarly situated Microsoft employees challenging Microsoft’s 
alleged pattern and practice of race and sex discrimination resulting 
from discrimination in performance appraisals.113  Specifically, 
plaintiffs challenged Microsoft’s forced ranking system, calling it 
“excessively subjective,” and alleged that the system is used to 
generate evaluations based on the biases of managers—who are 
predominantly white males—rather than on appraisals that are based 
on employee merit.114  The evaluations are the primary tool at 
Microsoft for awarding compensation increases and promotion 
 
demonstrate to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. 
 111 See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) 
(indicating that a plaintiff does not set forth a prima facie case of disparate impact by 
producing “bottom line” evidence that a racial imbalance exists in the company); see 
also infra  notes 155-56 and accompanying text for an explanation of “bottom line” 
evidence. 
 112 Order of Coughenour, supra note 107, at 5.  Mr. Browne filed an appeal with 
the Ninth Circuit.  Telephone Interview with Jerry McNaul, Esquire, McNaul Ebel 
Nawrot Helgren & Vance, P.L.L.C. (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter McNaul Telephone 
Interview].  The author of this Comment contacted Jerry McNaul, attorney for Mr. 
Browne, to inquire as to the status of the pending appeal.  According to Mr. McNaul, 
Mr. Browne’s case was argued before the Ninth Circuit on July 12, 2002.  See E-mail 
from Jerry McNaul, Esquire, McNaul Ebel Nawrot Helgren & Vance, P.L.L.C., to 
Meredith L. Myers, Comment Author (Sept. 4, 2002, 1:53 EST) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter McNaul E-mail].  Mr. McNaul was unable to provide the author with any 
additional information, because the Ninth Circuit entered a protective order in late 
2001, cloaking the case in secrecy.  Id.  All records were sealed and the attorneys on 
both sides were prohibited from discussing or commenting on the action.  McNaul 
Telephone Interview, supra note 112.  When the author contacted Mr. McNaul in 
late August 2002, the gag order remained in place.  McNaul E-mail, supra note 112.  
As of the date this Comment was written, the Ninth Circuit had not yet entered a 
decision.  Id. 
 113 Class Action Complaint at 2, Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., No. C00-1684 
(W.D. Wash. 2000) [hereinafter Donaldson Complaint].  Ms. Donaldson’s claims 
rested on alleged “violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”  Id. 
 114 Id. at 3; see also Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999) 
(discussing the existence of unconscious biases); Davidson, supra note 19, at 1611 
(noting the existence of a subconsciously biased performance evaluation); Anne 
Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. 
L. REV. 587, 607 (2000) (stating studies reveal that race and sex influence 
performance evaluations despite equal qualifications among candidates). 
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decisions.115 
In an order dated November 16, 2001, United States District 
Judge for the Western District of Washington, Marsha Pechman, 
denied class action status to plaintiffs’ complaint and concluded that 
“Microsoft’s managerial system is not inherently flawed,” but rather 
appears to be “a well-crafted combination of both objective and 
subjective measures.”116  Judge Pechman reasoned that in order to 
demonstrate Microsoft’s ratings system is detrimental to its 
employees, plaintiffs would need to proffer evidence of disparate 
impact117 or disparate treatment118 arising from Microsoft’s ranking 
system.119  Judge Pechman found that plaintiffs failed to satisfy that 
burden.120  The order explained that plaintiffs could have shown 
disparate impact if they had submitted clear statistical evidence that 
proved Microsoft’s performance management system created 
significant adverse effects on women and African Americans.121  
 
 115 Donaldson Complaint, supra note 113, at 3. 
 116 Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 12. The court further noted that each 
employee is in a salary ladder that requires certain attributes be met in order for an 
employee to move up the ladder.  Id.  Judge Pechman reasoned that while employees 
are graded on a bell curve, the subjectivity that is inherent in such a ranking is 
tempered by the advance notice employees are given as to what is required for them 
to meet their job expectations, and the fact that any employee who believes he was 
unfairly graded may appeal his grade.  Id. at 13. 
 117 See discussion of disparate impact infra Part IV.A. 
 118 “Disparate treatment” is not being addressed in this Comment.  In an effort to 
better comprehend the scope and impact of the court’s decision, however, the 
author will provide the reader with a working definition of disparate treatment.  A 
prima facie case of disparate treatment is set forth by a plaintiff who proves that 
intentional discrimination took place by an employer.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  The basic elements of a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment are: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (2) the 
employer was seeking applicants for a job that the plaintiff applied and was qualified 
for; (3) but was nonetheless rejected; and (4) after the plaintiff was rejected, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants of similar 
qualifications as the plaintiff.  Id.  Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment, the burden shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s rejection.  Id.  The plaintiff is given the 
opportunity to rebut the employer’s justification by demonstrating that the 
employer’s offered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.  Id. at 804.  See also 
Christopher Dee, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under Title VII, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 958 (1987). 
 119 Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 5. 
 120 According to the opinion, “broad managerial discretion in employment 
practices is not itself discriminatory.”  Id.  Plaintiff would have to “establish a link 
between Microsoft’s practices and some measurable impact on women and African 
American employees” to challenge the subjectivity of Microsoft’s employment 
practices.  Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 121 Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 12.  For a cursory discussion of disparate 
treatment, see supra note 118.  Cf. Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical Analysis of Judicial 
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Instead, plaintiffs data was contradictory to their claims, and in fact 
suggested that “women and African Americans received greater benefits 
than their white male counterparts,” which in effect “cancelled out” 
the data suggesting a negative effect existed.122  The court granted 
summary judgment for Microsoft on all but one count, which 
permitted Ms. Donaldson to pursue individual disparate treatment 
claims against Microsoft.123  Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 
but then reached a confidential settlement with Microsoft while the 
request for appeal was pending.124 
III.  FORCED RANKINGS: A MIXED REACTION BY COMMENTATORS 
The litigation spurred by the use of forced ranking clearly 
demonstrates the method is highly controversial.125  Like most 
performance evaluation methods, forced ranking consists of both 
positive and negative aspects.  While there are arguments on both 
sides, however, this Comment ultimately concludes that force ranking 
employees is not per se illegal. 
The most significant and recurring justification proffered for the 
use of forced ranking is that it eliminates the tendency for 
management to give employees evaluations that do not accurately 
and honestly reflect employee performance.126  In the fairy tale “The 
Emperor’s New Clothes,” the Emperor’s court told him he looked 
“superb” in his new clothes.127  In fact, however, the Emperor was not 
wearing any clothing.128  Nonetheless, the Emperor’s court told him 
 
Opinions in Professional Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 HOWARD L.J. 723, 729 
(1983) (commenting that “[d]isparate impact is a more attractive theory than 
disparate treatment for most plaintiffs[,]” because a plaintiff need not show the 
alleged discrimination was intentional). 
 122 Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 123 Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 22, 24-25. 
 124 E-mail from Julie Goldsmith, Esquire, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, 
P.L.L.C., to Meredith L. Myers, Comment Author (Aug. 29, 2002, 9:36 EST) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Goldsmith E-mail]. 
 125 See supra Part II.B. 
 126 Managers or supervisors often permit their company’s evaluation system to 
function ineffectively to avoid open conflict.  BAKER, supra note 15, at 7.  Essentially, 
by fearing the repercussions of giving an employee an honest evaluation, managers 
are ignoring the inherent function of a performance evaluation and its potential to 
improve an employee’s performance.  Id.  When problems with an employee are 
revealed in an evaluation, but simply ignored and left uncorrected, the evaluation 
becomes valueless and nothing more than a waste of time and energy.  Id.  Once 
management and employees have noticed that the performance evaluation serves no 
real purpose, they both lose faith in the method.  Id. 
 127 MARK R. EDWARDS & ANN J. EWEN, 360º FEEDBACK: THE POWERFUL NEW MODEL 
FOR EMPLOYEE ASSESSMENT & PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 3 (1996). 
 128 Id. 
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what they thought he wanted to hear.129  As the Emperor well knew, 
people often tell others what they want to hear rather than what they 
need to hear.130  When the Emperor asked the most trusted members 
of his court to anonymously reveal to him what they “really” thought of 
his new clothes, the members told him the truth—that the Emperor 
was not wearing any clothes.131 
Many companies favor forced ranking, because candid 
evaluations tell an employee what he needs to hear, which has a direct 
causal relationship to the employee’s possibility for advancement 
within the company, his ability to receive promotions, raises and 
other incentives.132  Forced ranking generates an “effect” by providing 
employees with candor that “can overcome false self-perceptions, 
blind spots, and just plain ignorance.”133  Employees who are not 
content with their rank may not perceive the “effect” as positive.  
Eliminating deficient employees, however, allows a company to 
operate more productively, and may even save an employee’s job if 
the forced ranking makes the employee aware that he is not 
performing at the level expected by his company.134 
Although some commentators find forced ranking extremely 
useful, the method is also widely criticized and is often referred to as 
“rank and yank.”135  The most common criticism is that the criteria 
used to rank employees lacks objectivity.136  Critics argue the criteria 
subjects the evaluations to bias and generates a disparate impact on 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 3-4. 
 132 Many company executives advocate forced ranking as a way to compel 
managers to be more honest in evaluating workers.  The result is that managers 
make clearer distinctions among employees, because they are forced to single out 
employees not satisfying company standards. Claude Lewis, Does Worker Grading Fuel 
Bias?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 2001, available at LEXIS, News. 
 133 EDWARDS & EWEN, supra note 127, at 4. 
 134 Id. at 4-5.  Some proponents of forced ranking argue that the reason the 
method produces severe criticism, is because it requires “changing a deeply rooted 
corporate culture” where every employee was always “doing fine.”  Colvin, Above 
Average, supra note 11, available at 2001 WL 2173120.  Former GE CEO Jack Welch is 
likely the biggest advocate of forced ranking.  Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 
WL 5659587.  See notes 46 to 57 and accompanying text.  Another corporate advocate 
of forced ranking is Hewlett-Packard’s CEO Carly Fiona. Overkill, supra note 4, 
available at 2002 WL 5659587.  Ms. Fiona referred to Hewlett-Packard’s system as 
“management the way it was originally intended to be.”  Id. 
 135 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 2172786. 
 136 While criteria such as “teamwork” and “communication skills” are an integral 
part of an employee’s performance, they are “fuzzy qualitative criteria” that are hard 
to gauge objectively.  See id. 
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protected classes of employees.137  Another criticism is that forced 
ranking requires management to penalize an employee who is good, 
but not great, when the employee is ranked against the rest of his 
superstar team.138  Many employees contend that forced ranking is 
demoralizing and creates a competitive environment of intense 
internal conflict, eliminating the possibility for teamwork and 
cooperation.139 
IV.  DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT ON STATUTORILY PROTECTED GROUPS: 
THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY 
A.  Development of the Disparate Impact Theory 
Employers are not precluded by law from developing criteria or 
methods to evaluate employee job performance,140 and the use of 
subjective criteria is not per se illegal.141  Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (“1964 Act”),142 however, prohibits employers from 
making distinctions among employees based on “race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”143  Section 105(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 (“1991 Act”)144 amended section 703 of Title VII of the 1964 Act, 
further expanding the protections afforded to employees, because 
the addition of subsection (k) makes disparate impact an “unlawful 
employment practice.”145 
Disparate impact is a “fuzzy word” that is interpreted in varying 
 
 137 Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News; see also Lewis, supra note 132, 
available at LEXIS, News. 
 138 See Boyle, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 2172786.  Forced ranking critics 
argue that if companies are more selective in who they hire, the result will be a 
workforce full of “A” players.  Longnecker, supra note 5, at 
http://www.workforce.com/archive/feature/22/29/72/index.php.  Consequently, 
there would be no need for forced ranking.  Id. 
 139 Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587.  By force ranking more 
than half of a company’s employees as average, critics argue the system encourages 
“mediocre performance” and opens a “Pandora’s Box” of problems such as 
infighting, bias, and litigation—which ultimately impacts a company in a negative 
way.  Id. 
 140 See Mack A. Player, Applicants, Applicants in the Hall, Who’s the Fairest of Them All? 
Comparing Qualifications Under Employment Discrimination Law, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 
(1985). 
 141 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 45, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/ 
whatsnew/articles/new237.html; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 
(1988). 
 142 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2002). 
 143 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2002). 
 144 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2002). 
 2003 COMMENT 699 
ways.146  The Supreme Court defined disparate impact in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,147 stating that claims of 
disparate impact involve the use of “employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified 
by business necessity.”148  Furthermore, a plaintiff need not prove a 
discriminatory motive existed in order to prevail on a theory of 
disparate impact.149 
The Supreme Court first recognized that disparate impact 
liability is encompassed in Title VII of the 1964 Act in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.150  The Supreme Court further expanded the reach of 
disparate impact liability, holding unanimously in Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust151 that disparate impact analysis could be applied to the 
subjective criteria of an employer’s selection procedures “in 
appropriate cases.”152  According to the Court, the “premise of the 
disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, 
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in 
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”153 
Although confirming that disparate impact analysis may be 
applied to subjective employment practices, the Supreme Court 
narrowed the plaintiff’s reach substantially in Wards Cove Packing Co. 
 
 146 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 624 (1989); Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 147 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 148 Int’l Bhd., 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
 149 Id.  Cf. discussion of “disparate treatment,” supra note 118.  See also  Howard-
Martin, supra note 121. 
 150 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  The Griggs Court acknowledged that “The Act proscribes 
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation.  The touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.”  Id. at 431; see also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,  
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 235 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL.]. 
 151 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
 152 Id. at 991. 
 153 Id. at 987; see also Wax, supra note 114 (discussing the existence of two forms of 
biases—the “conscious” which encompasses deliberate or purposeful animus, the 
“unconscious” which is an automatic and inadvertent form of bias, and how the 
unconscious bias may have a spillover effect into employee performance appraisals); 
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 251 (“Immunizing subjective employment 
practices from impact attack could encourage employers to abandon objective job 
selection measurements in favor of subjective ones that could easily mask 
discriminatory intent or that could give effect to subconscious stereotypes or 
prejudices.”). 
 700 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:681 
v. Atonio,154 by holding that a plaintiff may not establish a prima facie 
case of disparate impact by merely pointing to “bottom line” 
disproportion.155  Rather, “a plaintiff must demonstrate . . . a . . . 
particular employment practice . . . has created the disparate impact 
under attack.”156 
Congress, in response to the Wards Cove decision, codified 
disparate impact in the 1991 Act.157  Essentially, Congress reversed the 
Wards Cove burden of proof allocation in disparate impact cases, 
provided new definition to what a plaintiff is required to demonstrate 
to establish a sufficient case of disparate impact discrimination, and 
rejected the Court’s definition of the business necessity defense set 
forth in Wards Cove.158 
Today, in the wake of changes brought about by the 1991 Act, a 
plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact 
must first identify the practice challenged, and then prove that the 
employer’s use of the challenged practice causes “a sufficiently 
disparate impact on a statutorily protected group.”159  This standard 
can be a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs when the challenged 
employment practice is not easily discernable.160  An example of an 
easily discernable employment practice would be a test identified by a 
plaintiff as a barrier to the employment of minorities within a 
particular company.161  The focus of disparate impact theory is “upon 
the adverse effect of a particular practice or selection device on an 
appropriate labor pool.”162  Because forced ranking systems often 
encompass a combination of both objective and subjective criteria, it 
 
 154 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 155 Id. at 657.  Merely demonstrating that a racial imbalance exists in the 
workforce is considered bottom line evidence of disproportion and insufficient to 
satisfy the burden of demonstrating a sufficient case of disparate impact.  Rosemary 
Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1011, 1015 (1993). 
 156 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. 
 157 Alito, supra note 155, at 1013-14. 
 158 Id. at 1014. 
 159 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 246; see also Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason 
Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a disparate impact claim 
where “plaintiffs merely launched a wide-ranging attack on the cumulative effects of 
[their employer’s] employment practices.  The disparate impact model is not the 
appropriate vehicle from which to launch such an attack.”).  Demonstration by a 
plaintiff that a company has an “overall lack of women or minorities in a particular 
workplace or job classification” is generally insufficient to show a disparate impact 
exists.  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 246.  Instead, a plaintiff must specifically 
identify the practice he believes is creating a disparate impact on his class.  Id. 
 160 See id. at 246-47. 
 161 Id. at 247. 
 162 Id. at 248 (emphasis added). 
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may prove difficult for plaintiffs to point to the precise criteria they 
believe are creating the disparity. 
If an employee successfully establishes a prima facie case of 
disparate impact, employers may defend their policy by setting forth 
their own evidence to rebut the employee’s evidence of disparate 
impact.163  While the burden is initially on the plaintiff-employee to 
prove his prima facie case, if the employee makes his case, the burden 
of proof and persuasion then shifts to the defendant-employer to 
show that “the challenged practice is job related . . . and consistent with 
business necessity.”164 
Congress left the meaning of the terms “job related” and 
“business necessity” undefined, resulting in ambiguity and many 
unanswered questions.165  The only guidance Congress provides for 
those seeking to define the terms “job related” and “business 
necessity,” is in an Interpretive Memorandum166 referred to at Section 
105(b) of the 1991 Act.167  The Interpretive Memorandum, however, 
leaves much unresolved and does little to remedy the debate.168  The 
Interpretive Memorandum merely directs courts to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions preceding Wards Cove, including Griggs, and 
indicates that the Interpretive Memorandum is the sole source of 
legislative history to be relied on when interpreting the terms.169  The 
result is continued uncertainty, because the Court’s decisions 
 
 163 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2002); see also Alito, supra note 155, at 
1016-17; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 280-83; Kay H. Hodge, The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, SG060 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 337, 346-47 (Mar. 
2002). 
 164 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2002) (emphasis added); see also Alito, supra 
note 155, at 1021; Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 
Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1026 (2002); Daniel M. Tardiff, Knocking on the 
Door: Finally an Answer from Within for Employment Testers, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 909, 923-
24 (2001). 
 165 See, e.g., Alito, supra note 155, at 1021-40.  See also Tardiff, supra note 164, at 
n.120 (discussing that due to the 1991 Act’s vagueness in defining the terms 
“business necessity” and “job related,” there is potential for a conservative federal 
bench to define the terms along the lines of the Supreme Court’s Wards Cove 
decision). 
 166 The Interpretive Memorandum may be found at 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). 
 167 Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105(b) Stat. 1071 (1991); see, e.g., Alito, supra note 155, at 
1018-19; Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
666 (2001). 
 168 See Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1160-61 (1993) (stating Congress “punted” by failing to give 
meaning to what the terms business necessity and job related mean, and by failing to 
resolve the debate). 
 169 See, e.g., Alito, supra note 155, at 1018-19; Jolls, supra note 167, at 666. 
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involving the terms’ definitions have been anything but uniform.170 
Relying on the decisions preceding Wards Cove, as Congress 
requires in its Interpretive Memorandum,171 if a defendant-employer 
cannot demonstrate that an exclusionary or discriminatory practice is 
related to job performance172 and is a reasonable measure of job 
performance,173 the practice will be prohibited.174  Under Griggs, if an 
employer’s proffered justification for the use of the challenged 
practice is to upgrade its labor pool, a court must find the rationale 
insufficient to establish that the discriminatory practice is “job 
related” or a “business necessity.”175  More often than not, empirical 
data is preferred to corroborate a precise connection between the 
challenged practice and the employer’s justification for it.176  In some 
cases, the Supreme Court requires employers to justify their defenses 
with empirical data.177  At other times, however, the Court states that 
such “validation criteria” are not explicitly required, because some 
qualities such as ambition, loyalty, and common sense cannot be 
measured quantitatively through validation criteria.178  “While Griggs . 
. . [and] Dothard . . . adopted a strict approach . . . Watson reflect[ed] 
a more lenient view of the job relatedness and business necessity 
defense.”179  Congress, however, appears to align with the Griggs 
model through its express reference to the case in its Interpretive 
Memorandum.180  If the defendant-employer sufficiently rebuts 
plaintiff’s prima facie case by proving that its performance evaluation 
system is job related and a business necessity, the plaintiff may still 
prevail181 if he can show that an “alternative employment practice”182 
 
 170 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 286; see also Susan S. Grover, The Business 
Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 393 (1996) 
(indicating that the Court’s prior decisions were not consistent with each other, 
requiring that the interpretation of “business necessity” and “job related” rely on 
policy and theoretical underpinnings). 
 171 See supra note 166. 
 172 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 173 See id. at 436. 
 174 See id. at 431. 
 175 401 U.S. 424 (1974). 
 176 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 286. 
 177 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (rejecting defendant-
employer’s justification for the challenged practice, because the defendant-employer 
failed to provide empirical data to support its argument). 
 178 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). 
 179 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 289. 
 180 Id.  Conversely, Congress made no mention of the more lenient approach set 
forth in Wards Cove.  Id. 
 181 This surrebuttal offered to plaintiffs is not withstanding a threshold showing of 
disparate impact.  It is still required that plaintiff prove a prima facie case of disparate 
 2003 COMMENT 703 
exists that would produce the same effect as the challenged practice 
and the employer refuses to adopt it.183 
The history of disparate impact since Griggs and Watson remains 
complicated and confusing to apply.184  In fact, courts still engage in 




impact in conjunction with the fact that an alternative employment practice exists.  
See Bryant v. City of Chi., 200 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that if the 
defendant-employer rebuts plaintiff’s initial prima facie case, the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff for another opportunity to present her case by proving an alternative 
existed to the challenged practice that would serve the same purpose); Price v. City 
of Chi., 251 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that an 
alternative would have a lesser impact on African Americans because plaintiff did not 
sufficiently prove that the present method the employer was using created an adverse 
impact); see also Susan Marie Connor & Tom H. Luetkemeyer, Employment 
Discrimination and Discharge, ILLINOIS ICLE HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION 
2, 2.51 (Apr. 2002); Hodge, supra note 163, at 346-47. 
 182 The meaning of “alternative employment practice” is not easily discernable.  
See Michael J. Zimmer, Individual Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 484-503 (for a thorough discussion of 
the definition of “alternative employment practice”).  For purposes of this Comment, 
the author uses the meaning set forth by the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (indicating that alternative employment practices 
include “other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, 
[that] would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest . . . .”). 
 183 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2002). However, plaintiff is required to 
prove that the alternative employment practice “would be equally as effective as the 
challenged practice in serving the employer’s legitimate business goals.”  Wards Cove, 
490 U.S. at 661 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 998).  The Wards Cove Court recognized 
that courts should be cautious in mandating that an employer adopt a plaintiff’s 
alternative business practice, because courts are less qualified than employers to 
reform a business practice.  Id. at 661. 
 184 See Zimmer, supra note 182, at 473-74 (noting Congress’ choice to leave the 
definitions of business necessity and job relatedness open to interpretation based on 
the Court’s decisions preceding Wards Cove has “raise[d] as many questions as it 
[has] answered”). 
 185 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 243.  While the issue of disparate impact 
theory has been squarely addressed and found to encompass Title VII actions, there 
is currently a circuit split on the issue of whether the theory applies to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  See Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n & Prof. 
Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1995) (disparate impact theory not available 
under ADEA); see also EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 
1994) (disparate impact theory not available under ADEA); Frank v. United Airlines, 
216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (disparate impact theory is available under ADEA); Ellis 
v. United Airlines 73 F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996) (disparate impact theory is not 
available under ADEA).  The Court has determined that disparate impact does not 
apply to discrimination claims arising under section 1981.  Gen. Bldg. Contractors 
Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 
150, at 245 (noting circuit split over the application of the disparate impact theory to 
ADEA claims). 
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B.  Application of Disparate Impact Theory to the Forced Ranking 
Method of Performance Evaluation 
1.  Disparate Impact: Is it too early to know? 
It would be impossible to determine, and careless to state, that 
forced ranking performance management systems by nature create a 
disparate impact on statutorily protected classes.186  While critics may, 
in fact, make valid and notable comments, their criticisms are public 
policy/management arguments and not legal arguments.  Forced 
ranking is legal,187 as is using subjective criteria to conduct 
performance evaluations.188  Rather, it is when employers blatantly 
ignore or fail to recognize that a particular facet of their forced 
ranking model is creating, or has the potential to create, a disparate 
impact on statutorily protected groups that they encounter 
problems.189  In essence, it is an employer’s “failure to cover its bases” 
that generates potential dilemmas.190  The law sets forth precisely 
what is required for a plaintiff to prove disparate impact.191 
Consequently, employers should be prepared to combat potential 
litigation through judicious risk-management. 
There is no study proving that forced ranking inherently 
produces a disparate impact.  As discussed in Part III, virtually every 
case filed challenging a company’s forced ranking model has been 
settled, granted summary judgment, or is presently on appeal—with 
the most recent appeals192 being cloaked in confidentiality.  
 
 186 Despite requests to squarely address the alleged disparate impact of forced 
ranking systems, the Supreme Court has not yet entertained this request.  At least for 
now, determining whether forced ranking creates a disparate impact on protected 
classes must involve a case-by-case analysis.  Each company’s forced ranking system is 
unique, which will require each plaintiff challenging the effects of a particular system 
to proffer statistical evidence.  As the Court held in Wards Cove, “bottom line” 
statistics are insufficient.  See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.  Instead, a 
plaintiff must provide statistical evidence that establishes a substantial disparity exists.  
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988). 
 187 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 45, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/ 
whatsnew/articles/new237.html. 
 188 See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. 977. 
 189 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (stating that 
practices or procedures that maintain prior discriminatory effects are illegal—even if 
they appear neutral on their face). 
 190 This Comment argues a company can insulate itself from losing in litigation by 
taking certain risk-management measures.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 191 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 192 The appeal filed by Peter M. Browne against Microsoft Corporation is 
shrouded by a protective order.  McNaul Telephone Interview, supra note 112.  All 
records are under seal and the attorneys have been ordered not to speak about the 
case.  Id. 
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Nonetheless, employers should not sit idly by dawdling under the 
umbrella of status quo.  It would be foolish for employers to ignore 
the rise in litigation resulting from the use of forced ranking.  
Employers can look to the law regarding disparate impact to 
determine how courts will evaluate whether or not their performance 
evaluation systems cause a disparate impact,193 and it would be 
prudent for companies to utilize the framework provided by the case 
law and statutes to ensure that their forced ranking model is in 
compliance with the framework provided by the Supreme Court and 
Congress. 
2.  Risk-Management Measures 
Some litigation is an inevitable result and costly aspect of 
employment decisions.194  Fortunately, safeguards are available to 
employers—the choice is ultimately theirs as to whether they choose 
to utilize those safeguards.  One of the most powerful protections 
available to employers is the “virtual roadmap” of protection afforded 
by a close examination of the current state of anti-discrimination law.  
The virtual roadmap for analyzing the legality of a company’s forced 
ranking system is a disparate impact analysis.195  While there are no 
failsafe protections, this Comment proposes that an employer can 
utilize knowledge afforded by the law prophylactically.  Consider why 
motorists wear safety belts.  Safety belts are prophylactic measures.  
Wearing a safety belt in an automobile does not prevent an accident, 
nor is it a guarantee that a motorist who wears a safety belt will not be 
injured if involved in an accident.  Nonetheless, studies reveal that 
safety belts are highly effective tools that, when worn properly, reduce 
a motorist’s chance of morbidity and mortality.196  Similarly, 
companies utilizing protective measures before employment 
 
 193 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 194 See Lauren M. Hollender & Martha L. Lester, Termination Guidelines; How 
Employers Can Reduce the Risk of Litigation During Downsizing, 9 EMPLOYMENT LAW 
STRATEGIST 1, 1 (Dec. 2001) (noting that poorly planned employment decisions may 
require a company to defend itself against costly litigation; while no employment 
decision is without risk, steps may be taken by companies employer to minimize the 
risks of employment decisions); Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in 
High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 954 (1982) (observing the pressure that is placed 
on employers to avoid litigation costs by adopting performance evaluation systems 
that have no adverse impact on protected classes at the outset); Davidson, supra note 
19, at 1615 (commenting on the enormous “financial, psychological and reputational 
costs” employment litigation places on employers). 
 195 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 196 See, e.g., Benefits of Safety Belts and Motorcycle Helmets: Report to Congress 1996, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, 
at i (on file with author). 
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litigation arises may not completely avoid litigation, but may be able 
to mitigate its impact. 
The purpose of this Comment is not to propose that an 
alternative employment practice exists.197  Nor does this Comment 
make a blanket suggestion that utilizing forced ranking systemically 
creates a disparate impact on statutorily protected groups.198  As 
discussed previously, it does not.199  Rather, this Comment suggests 
that a number of risk-management measures exist that employers 
may implement or follow to protect themselves from the potential for 
litigation this employment practice appears to have.200 
It would be prudent for a company to conduct statistical studies 
to ensure its forced ranking model is not generating a disparate 
impact on protected classes that is not otherwise justified by a valid 
business necessity defense, and that no alternative employment 
practice exists that would accomplish the same goal its forced ranking 
model seeks to effectuate.201  To do this, a company must first 
question why it is choosing to utilize forced ranking.202  The company 
must be prepared to prove that the goal it seeks to achieve is critical 
to the company’s success, and that the employment practice is vital to 
achieve the company’s goals.203  If the company can demonstrate that 
the rationale underlying its choice to use a forced ranking system is 
to solve an internal problem or to add value to the company or its 
workforce, it has likely articulated a strong argument.204 
In addition to performing empirical studies, employers should 
be thoughtful when formulating the criteria for employees’ 
evaluations and when creating the format for the forced ranking 
model—always mindful of the “disparate impact virtual roadmap.”  
 
 197 See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
 199 See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. 
 200 See Crane, supra note 45, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/ 
whatsnew/articles/new237.html; Employee Evaluations—Does Your Company Earn an 
‘A’?, 10 CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER 4 (Mar. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Employee 
Evaluations]; see also Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 3-5. 
 201 See Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 3-5 (noting the necessity that 
employers conduct statistical analysis to ensure their employment practices do not 
generate a disproportionate adverse impact on protected classes); see also discussion 
Part IV.A. 
 202 See, e.g., Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 3-5. 
 203 Grover, supra note 170, at 429-30; see also MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 
326. Cf. Len Biernat, Subjective Criteria in Faculty Employment Decisions Under Title VII: A 
Camouflage for Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 501, 516 
(1986-1987) (observing courts’ reluctance to get involved in business decisions due 
to their lack of expertise). 
 204 See id. 
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Forced ranking systems are legal so long as employers execute them 
properly.205  Employees should be provided with advance notice of the 
new policy,206 and given clearly articulated objectives and measurable 
expectations.207  The model formulated needs to deepen the 
employee’s understanding of his performance so that he may work 
on areas in which he may be weak.208 
Once the forced ranking system is successfully implemented, 
employers should continue practicing certain risk-management 
measures.  Companies must comply with any reforms to Title VII that 
would affect them.209  Furthermore, supervisors or managers 
conducting appraisals must be properly trained210 and given specific 
written instructions with unambiguous guidelines on the purpose of 
the employee’s evaluation, the manner in which it will be used, the 
process for completing the evaluation, warnings regarding certain 
biases, and clear-cut criteria211 on which supervisors are to base their 
judgments.212  Supervisors must be instructed to carefully document 
justifications for the given judgment on each criterion,213 citing 
specific examples where possible.214  If practicable, employers should 
try to combine information from various sources and allow more than 
 
 205 Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587. 
 206 See id.; Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 2 (observing the importance 
from a risk-management perspective of giving employees advance notice of 
employment decisions). 
 207 See Employee Evaluations, supra note 200; Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 
WL 5659587; MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326. 
 208 Bruce Pfau et al., Does 360-Degree Feedback Negatively Affect Company Performance?, 
HRMAGAZINE (June 1, 2002), available at 2002 WL 7664616. 
 209 Biernat, supra note 203, at 543. 
 210 See PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS, supra note 30, at 50 (discussing a study where 
evaluations given by supervisors who received a training course on how to conduct 
effective evaluations, solicited the most positive responses from the employees 
evaluated); MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326 (in addition to written 
instructions, supervisors or managers performing employee evaluations should be 
trained in how to reduce rating contamination, and how to discuss with an employee 
his evaluation); Employee Evaluations, supra note 200. 
 211 The criteria used to evaluate employees should be rationally related to 
company goals and values.  See Messmer, supra note 35; see also discussion supra Part 
III.A. 
 212 MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326. 
 213 See Player, supra note 140, at 300 (remarking that when an employee’s 
evaluation reflects poor job performance, the employer should cite specific examples 
regarding why that determination was reached). 
 214 See Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587 (commenting that to 
assist a company in avoiding claims of bias in evaluations, it is important for 
employers to provide concrete examples in an employee’s evaluation of  what is 
deemed good and bad performance). 
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one person to evaluate an employee.215  Equally important, however, 
is the need to articulate to employees the goals and functions the 
ranking system seeks to serve.216  Implementing such a practice 
develops a system of checks and balances on the forced ranking 
system—which may ultimately guard against unconscious bias.217  A 
copy of the evaluation should be provided to the employee and be 
signed by both the employee and the person who evaluated him.218  
The employee should receive an opportunity to discuss his 
performance evaluation and subsequent ranking with his employer,219 
and be afforded the opportunity to challenge his ranking through an 
internal dispute system.220 
Companies must also ensure that the evaluations used to force 
rank their employees are taken seriously221 and are utilized and 
conducted consistently.222  This may include evaluating managers on 
their ability to conduct fair evaluations that satisfy company goals.223  
Periodic monitoring of the forced ranking management system 
should take place to maintain the reliability and integrity of the 
system, and to evaluate whether it is still sufficiently satisfying 
corporate goals.224  Moreover, in an attempt to guard against bias and 
discrimination, employers may want to consider implementing 
diversity awareness training for managers conducting performance 
evaluations.225 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment explored the controversial performance 
management system referred to as forced ranking.  Forced ranking is 
strongly advocated by employers who seek to compel managers to 
 
 215 Biernat, supra note 203, at 545 (observing that fair personnel decisions are 
more likely to result when an employer uses information from a variety of sources, 
and that utilizing such a system has the potential to reduce discrimination). 
 216 See, e.g., Pfau et al., supra note 208, available at 2002 WL 7664616. 
 217 Id.; see also Wax, supra note 114 (setting forth what unconscious bias is). 
 218 Davidson, supra note 19, at 1628 (observing that requiring both parties to sign 
an evaluation and then giving the employee a copy of the appraisal puts an employee 
on notice that his performance is well documented). 
 219 MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326. 
 220 See Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587. 
 221 Employee Evaluations, supra note 200. 
 222 See BAKER, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that one of the inherent problems with 
performance appraisals is the failure of employers to utilize the evaluations, 
consequently permitting their performance management systems to function 
ineffectively). 
 223 Employee Evaluations, supra note 200. 
 224 MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 327. 
 225 Wax, supra note 114, at 1184-85. 
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provide employees with candid feedback.226  Traditional performance 
evaluations consistently permit underperformers to maintain their 
status within a company, because managers fear the potential 
repercussions from employees who receive negative evaluations.227  
The end result is a company rife with underperformers, and whose 
ultimate productivity and profit suffer.  Forcing managers to rank 
employees against each other requires managers to take an honest 
look at their workforce, while allowing them to eliminate employees 
not satisfying company standards. 
The battle cry of plaintiffs opposed to forced ranking systems is 
that they create a disparate impact on protected classes of persons.  
This Comment summarized what is required for a plaintiff to prove a 
prima facie case of disparate impact, discussed the defenses available 
to defendant-employers, and ultimately concludes that because 
statistical data is required to prove disparate impact, it would be 
imprudent to attach a systemic accusation of disparate impact on 
forced ranking.  Instead, each challenged forced ranking system will 
likely require a case-by-case analysis.  By engaging in carefully 
planned risk-management measures, however, employers can greatly 
reduce, if not eliminate, their chances of losing in litigation 
challenging their forced ranking performance management systems. 
 
 226 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 227 See id. 
